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WHY NOT STRIP TO SAVE YOUR HOME?
PROHIBITION ON CHAPTER 7 STRIP OFF
MAKES NO CENTS FOR DEBTORS OR
CREDITORS
Brendan Buschman*
INTRODUCTION
A 2012 bankruptcy decision by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, In re McNeal,1 may have the
answer to the current wave of homes in foreclosure. As of
December 2012, “[a]pproximately 1.2 million [American] homes
were in the national foreclosure inventory.”2 A home is in the
foreclosure inventory if it is “in any stage of the foreclosure
process.”3 Although the 2012 inventory numbers show a decline of
19.5 percent from 2011,4 the 2012 foreclosure statistics are still
much higher than foreclosure statistics from 2000 to 2006.5 In fact
56,000 completed foreclosures occurred in December 2012, as
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; M.A.T., Manhattanville College,
2007; B.A., Hunter College, 2004. Many thanks to Jennifer, my beautiful wife
and a wonderful mother to our son Gerald. Thanks to the editors and staff of the
Journal of Law & Policy for all their helpful suggestions. Thanks also to my
mother Mary F. Kelly for her constant support. And special thanks to my father,
the late Hon. Howard C. Buschman III, who always tried to help the little guy.
1
In re McNeal, 477 F. App’x 562 (11th Cir. 2012).
2
CoreLogic Reports 767,000 Completed Foreclosures in 2012,
CORELOGIC (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/
corelogic-reports-767,000-completed-foreclosures-in-2012.aspx.
“CoreLogic
(NYSE:CLGX) is a leading property information, analytics and services
provider in the United States and Australia. The company’s combined data from
public, contributory, and proprietary sources includes over 3.3 billion records
spanning more than 40 years . . . .” Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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compared to an average of 21,000 completed foreclosures per
month from 2000 to 2006.6
Many homes in foreclosure are a product of irresponsible
borrowing and irresponsible lending.7 During the real estate boom
of the early 2000s, when home values were consistently increasing,
many consumers purchased new homes or borrowed against the
equity in their homes.8 Numerous borrowers had poor credit or a
history of irresponsible financial decision-making.9 Lenders sold
loans to people whom they knew or suspected had poor credit or
financial qualifications.10 Further, many borrowers falsified their
financial qualifications in order to receive loans.11
Lenders had an incentive to sell as many mortgages as
possible.12 Wall Street investment firms like Bear Stearns bought
these mortgages, pooled them, and sold them to other investors.13
Thus, lenders were able to pass their liability on the interest to the
Wall Street investors. The Wall Street investors then sold those
mortgages and passed liability onto the subsequent buyer.14 Once
the borrowers began to default on the loans—loans which most
could not afford in the first place—the final owners of the
mortgages had a virtually worthless investment.15
These defaulted mortgages destroyed the American housing
market, which, in turn, devastated the world economy.16 Wall
Street investment firms stopped buying mortgages from lenders,
and the mortgage lending market dried up.17 Home prices declined
drastically.18 Many homeowners saw the value of their homes drop

6

Id.
House of Cards (CNBC television broadcast June 4, 2009).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
7
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below the amount of their first mortgage.19
Historically, the federal bankruptcy courts are places for
homeowners to seek refuge from foreclosure.20 The filing of a
bankruptcy petition automatically stays any foreclosure action by
the lender until the bankruptcy case is either discharged or
closed.21 A stay forces the foreclosing lender to delay any
foreclosure sale.22 A bankruptcy case may also alter the rights of a
creditor—foreclosing or not.23 A homeowner stands much to gain
if, during his bankruptcy, he can reduce the amount of money he
owes to a party holding a mortgage on his property.
Two ways of reducing the amount of money owed a mortgagee
are called strip down and strip off.24 The terms are not
synonymous, but they both act upon a lien on the debtor’s
property.25 In order to procure funds from a lender, a borrower
may grant that lender a right to certain property called collateral.26
That lender then holds a lien on the collateral.27 If the borrower
defaults on his payments to the lender, the lien is the instrument
19

Id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012) (staying any debt collection efforts,
including foreclosure, upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition).
21
Id.
22
See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.03[3] (Alan N. Resnick & Henry
J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 2013), available at LexisNexis (noting that the stay
acts as an injunction against all “legal proceedings against the debtor that were
or could have been commenced prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy
case”).
23
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (2012) (explaining that a bankruptcy
discharge removes personal liability on any judgment obtained against the
debtor).
24
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was the first federal
appellate court to grant strip off to a Chapter 7 debtor in Gaglia v. First Federal
Savings & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1311 (3d Cir. 1989). The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied Chapter 7 strip off in In re Dewsnup, 908
F.2d 588, 590 (10th Cir. 1990). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
was the first federal appellate court to allow a Chapter 7 strip off in In re
Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537, 1538 (11th Cir. 1989).
25
See Michael Myers, Dewsnup Strikes Again: Lien-Stripping of Junior
Mortgages in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1333, 1335 (2011).
26
See Joann Henderson, The Gaglia-Lowery Brief: A Quantum Leap from
Strip Down to Chapter 7 Cram Down, 8 BANKR. DEV. J. 131, 135–36 (1991).
27
Id.
20
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that gives the lender rights to collect on the debt. 28 The value of a
lien is simply the balance of the loan due the lender.29 To strip
down a lien means to reduce the value of the lien to the value of
the collateral secured.30 To strip off a lien means to remove the lien
entirely from the property the lien secures.31 In bankruptcy, both of
these concepts link inextricably to the value of the collateral and
the balance due the lienholder.32 For example, a homeowner owns
a home worth $150,000. Assume a lien encumbers this home; the
homeowner gave a lender the lien as consideration for the funds to
purchase the home. Assume the balance due the lienholder is
$200,000. This means the lien is worth $200,000. A homeowner
who wants to strip down a lien wants to reduce the value of the lien
from $200,000 to $150,000. Suppose the same home has an
additional, or junior, mortgage attached to it worth $50,000. The
proceeds from a sale of the home satisfy the senior mortgage in full
before they satisfy the junior mortgage at all.33 Thus, on our home
worth $150,000, with a senior mortgage worth $200,000, no value
attaches to any junior mortgage. A homeowner who tries to strip
off a lien will ask a bankruptcy court to remove in full the lien
attached to this junior mortgage.34
Both a strip down and a strip off are favorable to a homeowner
and unfavorable to a creditor. Each action asks the bankruptcy
court to disrupt valid interests secured in real property. However,
28

Id.
See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 413 (1992) (describing the
lien as worth $120,000, the balance owed the lender when the debtor filed for
bankruptcy).
30
Henderson, supra note 26, at 136.
31
See William P. Nacy, Note, Survival Underwater: Wholly-Unsecured
Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 40 WASHBURN L.J. 87, 94 n.43 (2000) (“To
strip off a lien is to avoid the lien in its entirety, such as when there is absolutely
no supporting value; i.e. a junior mortgage subordinated to a senior mortgage
which, upon foreclosure, yields nothing for distribution to the junior.”) (citing In
re Smith, 247 B.R. 191, 196 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2000)).
32
See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2012) (splitting the claim of an under-secured
lienholder into a secured claim and an unsecured claim based on the value of the
collateral).
33
See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW 819–21 (5th ed. 2007).
34
See Nacy, supra note 31, at 94 n.43.
29
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the disruption of property law is something that a bankruptcy court
often does in order to advance its policies of (1) a fresh start for the
debtor35 and (2) equality amongst creditors.36
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court held in Dewsnup v.
Timm37 that an individual debtor in Chapter 7 could not strip down
a lien attached to his primary residence.38 The market value of the
property covered some portion of the value of the lien.39 The
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit40 and two United
States Circuit Courts of Appeals41 have subsequently extended the
Dewsnup holding to prevent an individual debtor in Chapter 7
bankruptcy from stripping off a lien held by a junior mortgagee on
the debtor’s primary residence. These courts have incorrectly held
that a junior lien covered by no value in the collateral, like the
$50,000 junior lien in our example above, must remain fully intact
on the home of a Chapter 7 debtor.42
A prohibition on stripping off all junior liens could have
disastrous results for the housing industry and the entire United
States economy. Thousands of homeowners have multiple
mortgages on their homes, and, as a result of depressed housing
prices, many of these homes have at least one valueless junior lien
attached to it.43 To end the housing crisis, homeowners need to be
able to remain in their homes, and the amount of homes in
35

Henderson, supra note 26, at 136.
See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (describing equality
amongst creditors as “prime bankruptcy policy”) (citation omitted).
37
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
38
Id. at 417.
39
Id.
40
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit denied avoidance
of a junior lien in In re Laskin, 222 B.R. 872 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).
41
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied avoidance of a junior
lien in Ryan v. Homecomings Financial Network (In re Ryan), 253 F.3d 778 (4th
Cir. 2001), and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied avoidance of a
junior lien in Talbert v. City Mortgage Services (In re Talbert), 344 F.3d 555
(6th Cir. 2003).
42
See, e.g., In re Ryan, 253 F.3d at 783.
43
See Myers, supra note 25, at 1335 (“Th[e] steep drop in home values
[since 2007] left many homeowners stuck with homes that have depreciated in
value so much that their value does not even cover the debt they owe on
principal mortgages, much less junior mortgages.”).
36

272

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

foreclosure needs to decrease.44 A prohibition on stripping off all
junior liens could cause homeowners to abandon their homes,
drastically increasing the number of foreclosures.
In May 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
in In re McNeal correctly held that a Chapter 7 debtor may strip off
a valueless, junior lien on his primary residence.45 The court held
that the Dewsnup prohibition of stripping down a lien does not
compel a prohibition on stripping off a valueless, junior lien.46
The McNeal court reached the correct conclusion because a
Chapter 7 debtor needs the freedom to strip off a worthless junior
lien on his primary residence in order to retain his home. The
freedom to strip off this worthless junior lien is a necessary policy:
homeowners get a fresh economic start, and lienholders do not
suffer economically because the lien being stripped off is already
worthless.47 Further, the debtor’s dire need for a fresh start from
bankruptcy outweighs the lienholder’s interest in potential future
equity in the home.
Part I of this note introduces consumer bankruptcy and the
relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee that consumer
bankruptcy necessarily alters. Part II traces the history of strip
down in Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy, with particular attention
paid to Dewsnup v. Timm. Part III distinguishes strip off from strip
down and advocates for permitting strip off in Chapter 7. Part IV
argues that the policy reasons that make strip off permissible in
Chapter 13 bankruptcies should apply to Chapter 7 bankruptcies.

44

Congress has clearly noticed the need to reduce the number of homes in
foreclosure. To that end, Congress passed the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–289, 122 Stat. 2654 (2008). See also R. Travis
Santos, Comment, The Legal Way to Defeat Optimus Sub-Prime, 25 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 285, 287 (2008).
45
In re McNeal, 477 F. App’x 562, 564–65 (11th Cir. 2012).
46
Id.
47
See id. (noting that Dewsnup did not abrogate an Eleventh Circuit
precedent case, Folendore v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Folendore), 862 F.2d
1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989)). The Folendore court allowed strip off because it
would help a debtor and not harm an unsecured lienholder. 862 F.2d at 1540.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
A. Chapter 7 and Chapter 13: The Consumer Chapters
The Bankruptcy Code is a federal statute that allows both
businesses and individual consumers to reorganize or liquidate
under the protection of the federal judicial system.48 Congress has
amended the Code many times since its first drafting in 1978; the
most notable amendments were made in 1986, 1994, and 2005.49
Each federal district has a bankruptcy court, and each federal
district court refers its bankruptcy cases to these courts.50 Each
district court hears appeals of the decisions of its bankruptcy
court.51 A consumer bankruptcy case either liquidates the assets of
the debtor in satisfaction of his debts52 or adjusts the debtor’s debts
so that he may retain his assets and pay off his debts over time.53
The two most common types of bankruptcy for consumers are
Chapter 7 and Chapter 13.54 Chapter 7 is called the chapter for
“Liquidation.”55 Chapter 13 is called the chapter for “Adjustment
of Debts of an Individual With Regular Income,”56 also known as
reorganization.57 Chapter 13 enables the debtor to pay off creditors
from the debtor’s future earnings.58 Chapter 7, on the other hand,
requires a trustee in bankruptcy to pay off creditors from the
48

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2012).
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF
DEBTORS & CREDITORS 104–06 (6th ed. 2009).
50
Section 157(a) does not require district courts to refer cases to its
bankruptcy courts, but all district courts do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2012);
see also 2 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 3.02.
51
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 107.
52
See 6 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 700.01.
53
See 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1300.01.
54
See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012) (clarifying who may be a debtor and in
which bankruptcy chapter a debtor may file).
55
Id. §§ 701–84.
56
Id. §§ 1301–30.
57
See 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 1300.01 (noting that a Chapter 13
bankruptcy is not called a reorganization, but it “is in fact quite similar” to a
Chapter 11 reorganization).
58
See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (making regular income a
requirement for filing a Chapter 13 case).
49
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debtor’s present accumulated assets after liquidation.59 A
successful Chapter 13 case will usually last three to five years,60
whereas a typical Chapter 7 case lasts about three months.61 The
Chapter 13 debtor submits to the bankruptcy court a plan as to how
he will pay his creditors out of his future income.62 Every Chapter
13 plan requires the debtor to make monthly payments for a
minimum of three years and a maximum of five years.63 The
Chapter 13 debtor receives his discharge only upon completion of
all plan payments,64 but there is little required of the Chapter 7
debtor during the bankruptcy in order to get his discharge.65
B. The Debtor’s Affairs Pre-Bankruptcy
In order to understand how bankruptcy alters the relationships
of a debtor to his creditors, we must look at the debtor’s financial
relationships before the bankruptcy proceeding begins. Assume a
homeowner owns one home, which he lives in as his primary
residence, and has other debts owed to credit card companies. In
order to purchase the home, this hypothetical homeowner
borrowed $200,000 from a lender. In exchange, the homeowner
executed a promissory note to repay the $200,000 and granted a

59

6 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 704.02[1].
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4) (2012) (defining the “applicable commitment
period” for a debtor paying disposable income as at least 3 but no more than 5
years). This time period generally applies to a debtor with unsecured creditors
not being paid in full under the debtor’s plan. See 8 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶
1300.01 (noting that an unsecured creditor whose claim is not paid in full under
a debtor’s plan can object to plan confirmation to force the debtor to pay his
disposable income).
61
See Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code: The Chapter
7 Discharge, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/
BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2013) (noting that a
Chapter 7 case is typically discharged within “60 to 90 days after the date first
set for the meeting of creditors” prescribed by 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2012)).
62
11 U.S.C. §§ 1321, 1322(a).
63
Id. § 1325(b)(4).
64
Id. § 1328(a).
65
Id. § 727 (requiring the debtor to complete a course on personal financial
management before the court may issue him a discharge).
60
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security interest in his home to the lender.66 This security interest
gave the lender a lien on the property, and it is this lien that
enables the lender to foreclose on the home if the homeowner
defaults on his monthly mortgage payments.67 Assuming there
were no previous liens when the homeowner purchased his house,
this lender got the first, or senior, security interest in the property.68
This lien survives until the borrower pays in full the balance on the
promissory note.69
Let’s also assume that sometime after the purchase, the value
of the home increased to $250,000. The homeowner wanted to pay
off credit card debt or put an addition onto the home, so the
homeowner took out a home equity loan.70 A lender lent the
homeowner $50,000 and, in exchange, received a lien with a right
to foreclose on the property if the homeowner defaults on the
monthly payments.71 This lien also survives until the balance of the
note is paid in full,72 but this lien is considered junior to the
previous senior lien that was used to purchase the home.73 Thus,
the junior lienholder can only receive proceeds from a sale of the
home after the senior lienholder is satisfied in full.74
This same homeowner also has three credit cards. These credit
card companies will charge interest and fees on late payments, but,
unlike the lienholders, they do not have a security interest in any

66

See 12 KARL B. HOLTZSCHUE, PURCHASE AND SALE OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 36.01 (2009), available at LexisNexis (introducing the process of a
homebuyer granting a security interest to an entity which lends the money for
the home purchase).
67
See id. § 36.07[1][c] (“An action to foreclose must be predicated upon a
failure of the mortgagor . . . to perform the agreement for which the mortgage
was given as security.”).
68
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 819–21.
69
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, at § 36.06[2][b].
70
See, e.g., In re Bartee, 212 F.3d 277, 293 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that
home equity loans are generally used for personal spending).
71
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 36.07[1][c] (“An action to
foreclose must be predicated upon a failure of the mortgagor . . . to perform the
agreement for which the mortgage was given as security.”).
72
See id. § 36.06[2][b].
73
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 819–21.
74
Id.
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property of the homeowner.75 If the homeowner defaults on any of
the monthly payments, these credit card companies do not have the
recourse to begin an action to seize any specific property of the
homeowner.76
In this scenario, the homeowner had previously met all his
monthly payment obligations. However, perhaps he then lost his
job and could not find another one quickly. Or he might habitually
spend irresponsibly. Or perhaps he could never afford to sustain
monthly payments on the mortgage a lender sold him. For
whatever the reason, the homeowner defaults on his monthly
obligations. Most people who end up in bankruptcy will have
defaulted on all of their obligations.77 In the hypothetical here, the
homeowner does not pay the senior lender on his home, the junior
lender on his home, or the three credit card companies.
Each lender with a security interest begins a foreclosure
proceeding once the homeowner defaults.78 Those creditors
without security interests, like the credit card companies, begin to
make phone calls and deliver letters to the debtor’s home. 79 The
debtor can end the harassing debt collection efforts and stay any
initiated foreclosure proceeding by filing a bankruptcy petition.80
Filing a bankruptcy petition begins the debtor’s bankruptcy case. 81
Once the debtor receives a discharge of debts in bankruptcy,82 the
75

See, e.g., WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 223 (giving an
example of a typical consumer credit card agreement).
76
See id. (giving an example of a typical consumer credit card agreement);
see also id. at 38–44 (noting the rights of secured creditors against their
collateral).
77
See id. at 113 (noting that most consumer debtors would need to devote
years of annual income to paying off their debts, without having any funds
available to live on).
78
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 36.07[1][c] (“An action to
foreclose must be predicated upon a failure of the mortgagor . . . to perform the
agreement for which the mortgage was given as security.”).
79
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 138 (noting the debtor’s
need for “breathing room” from debt collection attempts).
80
Filing a petition automatically stays debt collection attempts. See 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
81
Id. § 301.
82
A bankruptcy discharge removes personal liability on all discharged
debts. 6 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 700.05.
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debtor has a fresh economic start.83
C. Secured and Unsecured Claims
The filing of the bankruptcy petition commences the debtor’s
case84 and establishes an estate85 of the debtor’s property.86 The
debtor lists his creditors on the bankruptcy petition, and, after those
creditors receive notice of the bankruptcy, the creditors submit
claims with the amount the debtor owes.87
The creditor’s claims will either be secured or unsecured.88 The
classification of claims depends on the nature of the claim held by
the creditor. In our example from above, the homeowner in default
on three credit cards has three unsecured creditors. These credit
card companies each hold an unsecured claim in the debtor’s
bankruptcy because none of them acquired a security interest in
property of the debtor. However, the senior lienholder who is owed
$200,000 does have a secured claim. This claim is secured because
the lienholder acquired a security interest in the debtor’s home. But
the Code ties the value of the lienholder’s interest into the
determination of a claim’s status.89 Section 506(a)(1) states that:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on
property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a
secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor’s interest in such property . . . and is an
unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such
creditor’s interest . . . is less than the amount of

83

“The whole point of bankruptcy is to provide a debtor with a fresh start.”
Folendore v. U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (In re Folendore), 862 F.2d 1537, 1540
(11th Cir. 1989).
84
11 U.S.C. § 301.
85
Id. § 541(a)(1) defines the bankruptcy estate as “all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”
86
Id. § 541(a).
87
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 502.01 (stating that one of the ways that
a claim is allowed is when “proof of a claim is filed or deemed filed and no
party objects”).
88
11 U.S.C. § 506.
89
Id. § 506(a)(1).
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such allowed claim.90
Courts have agreed that the market value of real property
determines the value of the creditor’s interest in that property.91
Thus, a lender with a security interest in real property has a
secured claim only up to the value of the collateral.92 Any portion
of the lender’s claim that exceeds the value of the collateral
becomes an unsecured claim in bankruptcy.93 Assume that the
home of our Chapter 7 debtor has a real market value of $150,000.
The balance on the mortgage to the senior lienholder is $200,000.
Therefore, under section 506(a), this senior lienholder has a
secured claim worth $150,000 and an unsecured claim worth
$50,000. The next section will reveal how the determination of a
claim as secured or unsecured can dramatically impact the amount
of payment a creditor receives.
II. STRIP DOWN IN CHAPTER 7
A. Payout to Creditors and Discharge
Once a Chapter 7 case begins, “[a] [t]rustee in [b]ankruptcy . . .
is appointed to gather all of the debtor’s property, to sell it, and to
distribute the proceeds to creditors.”94 In our example, and in
virtually all Chapter 7 cases, the trustee will not be able to gather
and sell enough property to satisfy in full the claims of all
90

Id. (alteration in original).
See, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1308
(3d Cir. 1989). Section 506(a)(2) dictates using replacement value for personal
property for an individual debtor in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, but it does not
dictate that replacement value be used for a Chapter 7 debtor’s real property. See
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2012). The Code still remains ambiguous as to which
exact market value is used for a Chapter 7 debtor’s real property. See 4 COLLIER,
supra note 22, ¶ 506.03[6].
92
See, e.g., Gaglia v. First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1308
(3d Cir. 1989) (noting that the under-secured lien is, under section 506(a), a
secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim in the
amount that exceeds the value of the collateral).
93
See, e.g., id. (noting that the under-secured lien is, under section 506(a),
a secured claim up to the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim in the
amount that exceeds the value of the collateral).
94
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 141.
91
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creditors.95 In fact, general unsecured creditors will often receive
nothing in Chapter 7 individual bankruptcies.96 Here, the debtor’s
home is worth $150,000 and two mortgages—–whose aggregate
value is $250,000–—encumber the home. The trustee will not look
to market and sell this home.97 This is because the secured
creditors must be satisfied before any sale proceeds can be used to
satisfy the unsecured creditors, and selling the home at market
value will not even satisfy the senior lienholder.98 And if the senior
lienholder is not satisfied in full, the unsecured creditors will get
nothing from the sale of the house.99 Thus, the trustee will not sell
the home.100
Even if our debtor’s home is not sold, the Chapter 7 debtor will
receive a discharge of his debts within a few months of filing.101
Discharge eliminates from the debtor all personal liability for
secured and unsecured debts.102 The removal of personal liability
means that no creditor—secured or unsecured—can sue the debtor

95

See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 507.02 (“Many bankruptcy cases do not
generate sufficient proceeds to pay in full all claims entitled to payment in the
case.”).
96
Section 726 governs the distribution of a Chapter 7 estate. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 726. Section 726 distributes first to priority claims, as defined by section 507,
in full before the general unsecured creditors receive any distribution from the
estate. Id. § 726(a)(6). At the very bottom of the distribution ladder is the debtor.
Id. For the types of claims given priority, see id. § 507.
97
Section 554(a) allows the trustee to “abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to
the estate.” Id. § 554(a).
98
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 113 (noting that
“mortgages and security interests” on the homes of many debtors disable his
ability to pay creditors from the home’s sale).
99
See id. at 141.
100
Section 554(a) allows the trustee to “abandon any property of the estate
that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to
the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 554(a).
101
See Liquidation Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 61.
102
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.02[1] (noting that “any judgment
on a discharged debt is void” because the discharge has removed the debtor’s
personal liability). Section 524(a)(2) bars creditors from any actions to collect
on a debt incurred before the debtor filed his prepetition. See 11 U.S.C. §
524(a)(2).
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for the debt.103 Note that unsecured creditors—like the three credit
card companies whom our debtor owes—had acquired only
personal liability against our debtor. For these creditors,
bankruptcy discharge erases any ability to recover on a debt.104
However, secured creditors acquired not just in personam rights
against the debtor, but also in rem rights against collateral when
the debtor was in default.105 For these creditors, the in personam
rights are extinguished but the in rem rights in the property itself
remain, even after the discharge.106 Thus, after the bankruptcy, the
secured creditor may still enforce its rights “against the
collateral . . . even though the debtor cannot be sued for any
deficiency.”107 A secured creditor may enforce these in rem rights
once the bankruptcy case closes, which lifts the stay on debt
collection efforts.108
A secured creditor asserts its rights over real property through
foreclosure.109 Foreclosure is a legal action.110 The foreclosing
lienholder files a complaint in state court, usually in the

103

See 6 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 700.05.
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 229–30. If a debtor is only
personally liable to a creditor, as is the case in a credit card relationship, removal
of personal liability removes any way for the creditor to collect on the debt. See
id. at 223.
105
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 36.07[1][a] (noting that a court
has in rem jurisdiction over land within its jurisdiction because of the creditor’s
in rem rights); see also id. § 36.07 (pointing out that a lienholder has a
deficiency judgment against the debtor for the amount to which the unpaid
balance due the lienholder exceeds the price of the collateral at the foreclosure
sale).
106
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.02[1] (relying on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding in Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 82–83 (1991),
when claiming that “the right to foreclose on a lien survives or passes through
bankruptcy unaffected by the discharge”). For a scathing criticism of protecting
a secured creditor’s in rem rights in bankruptcy, see Margaret Howard, Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy: An Essay on Missing the Point, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 313,
322 (1994) [hereinafter Howard, Secured Claims] (arguing that the secured
creditor in bankruptcy is entitled to the value of its collateral and nothing more).
107
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 262.
108
4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.02[1].
109
12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 36.07.
110
Id. § 36.07[1][a].
104
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jurisdiction of the property’s location.111 The lienholder will then
schedule a foreclosure sale of the property.112 Usually, the only
party to bid on the property at this sale will be the lienholder
itself.113 The price fetched at a foreclosure sale may be below the
market value of the home.114 In the case of our debtor, this means
that the home with a market value of $150,000 may sell for less at
the foreclosure sale. Thus, if the senior lienholder forecloses on
that property, the lender sustains a loss of at least $50,000.
A foreclosing lienholder usually can obtain a judgment against
the homeowner for the difference between the balance due the
lienholder and the amount of the foreclosure sale price.115
However, after a bankruptcy discharge, the lienholder cannot
obtain this judgment against the debtor because the discharge has
removed the debtor’s personal liability on the debt.116
B. Reaffirmation as an Alternative to Discharge
Often, a debtor does not receive discharge of all of his debts.117
The Code has provisions to prevent certain debts from being
discharged. The list of nondischargeable debts includes federal
student loans,118 any debt incurred through fraud by the debtor,119
and debts owed to the government,120among others.121 Also, a
debtor may decide to reaffirm a debt to a creditor instead of
receiving discharge of the debt.122
111

Id.
Id. § 36.07.
113
Id.
114
See id. § 36.07[4][b] (noting that sometimes the price at a foreclosure
sale does not “fairly recognize the value of that real estate”).
115
Id. § 36.07.
116
WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 262–63.
117
See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2012) (listing nineteen exceptions to discharge);
see also id. § 524(c) (describing the process of reaffirmation agreements).
118
Id. § 523(a)(8).
119
Id. § 523(a)(2).
120
Id. § 523(a).
121
See id. § 523(a) (listing many other nondischargeable debts).
122
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.04 (explaining the procedures for
reaffirming either secured or unsecured debts).
112

282

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

To understand the reasons behind reaffirmation of debt, we
must remember that sometimes it is advantageous for both a debtor
and creditor to continue their relationship.123 In our example
above, the debtor may wish to reaffirm the debt to the credit card
companies or the lienholders. The debtor may wish to do so
because he has a particular interest in continuing to borrow from a
certain credit card company. More likely, our debtor will wish to
reach a reaffirmation agreement with the lienholders on his home.
Reaffirmation is the only way to prevent post-bankruptcy actions
by the lienholders to repossess the property.124 This is because
reaffirmation is the only way to prevent discharge of the debts to
the lienholders,125 which leaves a secured creditor’s in rem rights
intact. Thus reaffirmation is a powerful motivator for homeowners
eager to keep their homes.
Reaffirmation of debt is a voluntary agreement between a
debtor and a creditor.126 Reaffirmation creates a new agreement127
and execution of the reaffirmation agreement waives the terms of
the previous agreement.128 However, the bankruptcy court and the
debtor’s counsel heavily scrutinize reaffirmation agreements.129
The court will only approve a reaffirmation agreement if it finds
123

See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 270 (noting that
sometimes a creditor will offer “future credit” to a debtor in exchange for a
reaffirmation agreement). A debtor may need this credit because he is “low on
assets.” Id. at 259.
124
That a “bankruptcy discharge [does] not prevent enforcement of valid
liens” has been the rule since Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886). 4 COLLIER,
supra note 22, ¶ 524.02[2][d]. This rule is not absolute, however. The Code
provides many ways for the lien of a secured creditor to be avoided during the
bankruptcy. Id. Long stands for the protection of all valid liens remaining after
the bankruptcy case closes. See Howard, Secured Claims, supra note 106, at 322
(“To cite Long for the proposition that “liens pass through bankruptcy” is simply
wrong. [Long], more accurately, stands for the proposition that liens pass
through bankruptcy when they are not dealt with during the case.”).
125
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.04 (describing a reaffirmation
agreement as a “binding agreement reaffirming a debt that would otherwise be
discharged”).
126
Id. ¶ 524.04[1].
127
See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 49, at 261–62.
128
See id.
129
See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (2012).
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that the agreement does not place an “undue hardship” on the
debtor’s fresh start.130 The debtor and creditor must agree to the
reaffirmation agreement before the debtor receives his
discharge.131
The debtor in our example wishes to retain his home. In order
to reaffirm the debt, he and the senior lienholder will negotiate in
order to come up with a new loan agreement. The lienholder incurs
a loss if it accepts a reaffirmation agreement that pays anything
less than $200,000, but this loss will be less than the loss of
foreclosing on the home. The debtor will agree to reaffirm a debt
he thinks he can pay because reaffirmation enables him to remain
in his home.
C. Section 506(d) and Strip Down
A discharge is perhaps the most powerful tool available to
provide the debtor with a fresh start. But the debtor may avail
himself of other tools before he receives the discharge. One of
these tools is in the bifurcation provision of section 506(a)(1)
mentioned above, which splits the claim of an under-secured
creditor into a secured claim and an unsecured claim, as
determined by the market value of the collateral.132 Another
provision designed to help the debtor is section 506(d), which
states that: “To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the
debtor that is not an allowed secured claim, such lien is
void . . . .”133 We have already noted that our senior lienholder
holds a lien against the debtor’s home, and that this lienholder has
a secured claim in the amount of $150,000 and an unsecured claim
in the amount of $50,000. Section 506(d) seems to void a lien
attached to any unsecured claim. Does section 506(d) enable our
homeowner to void the portion of the lien attached to the $50,000
unsecured claim? Voiding the portion of the lien attached to the
lienholder’s unsecured claim would have the effect of reducing the
130

See id. § 524(c)(3)(B).
See 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.04[1] (“To be enforceable, a
reaffirmation must be made before the granting of a discharge.”).
132
11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1).
133
Id. § 506(d).
131
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value of the lien from $200,000 to $150,000. If allowed, this would
be a strip down.
In 1989, the Third Circuit, in Gaglia v. First Federal Savings
and Loan Ass’n, held that the combination of section 506(a)(1) and
section 506(d) enabled strip down of an under-secured lien.134 In
that case the debtors sought to keep their home, which had a
market value of $34,000.135 A senior mortgage on the property had
a value of $28,873.50. Unlike our example, where the senior
mortgage is under-secured, the debtors’ senior mortgage was oversecured because the value of the home exceeded the balance due.
A junior mortgage on the property had “an outstanding balance of
more than $200,000.”136 The debtors wanted to avoid any portion
of the junior lien secured to their home which exceeded the home’s
value.137 The debtors hoped to reduce the under-secured junior lien
from over $200,000 to $5,126.50, the amount of the junior lien
covered by the home’s market value.138 The debtors wanted to
reaffirm the debt on that reduced amount and, thus, keep their
home.139
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit allowed the strip
down as the result of bifurcation by section 506(a)(1) and the lienavoidance of section 506(d).140 The court held that the plain
language of section 506(d), which voids a lien “[t]o the extent that
a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an allowed
secured claim,”141 voids all liens attached to an unsecured claim.142
134

The court held that the unsecured portion of the under-secured claim
was an unsecured claim and, thus, voided by 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). See Gaglia v.
First Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass’n, 889 F.2d 1304, 1307–08 (3d. Cir. 1989).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 1305. The debtors had taken out a small business loan and granted
the lender this large junior lien on their home as security. Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id. at 1308 (“While the [lienholder] is no worse off than if the property
were sold, the Gaglias may realize significant benefits from lien avoidance.
They may be better able to negotiate a repayment schedule with the [lienholder]
for the reduced amount of the secured claim. Thus, they have an increased
chance to retain their homestead.”).
140
Id. at 1308–09.
141
Id. at 1306 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1985)).
142
Id. (construing 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1985)).
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Additionally, under section 506(a)(1), the unsecured portion of the
debt became an unsecured claim. Therefore, section 506(d) voided
the lien attached to that claim since that lien was now unsecured.143
The court also reasoned that a strip down in this instance would not
harm the under-secured lienholder.144 If there were no strip down
and the lien remained intact, the debtor would not be able to
reaffirm the debt, and the under-secured lienholder would have the
right to foreclose on its $200,000 lien after the bankruptcy.145
However, a liquidation sale on that lien would only bring the
lienholder $5,126.50 if the property sold at market value, which is
the same amount the under-secured lienholder would receive after
the strip down.146 Thus, the court reasoned that stripping down a
lien to the value of the collateral would enable the debtors to keep
their home and would not harm the under-secured lienholder.147
D. Dewsnup v. Timm
The United States Supreme Court “stunned the bankruptcy
community”148 when, in 1992, it abrogated Gaglia and prohibited
strip down of an under-secured lien in Dewsnup v. Timm.149 In
Dewsnup, the debtors filed a Chapter 7 petition in the Bankruptcy
Court, District of Utah, in 1984.150 The debtors owned two parcels
of Utah farmland secured by a lien worth $120,000151 but defaulted
on their mortgage payments in 1979.152 In 1987, the debtors filed
an adversary proceeding153 seeking to reduce the value of the lien
143

Id.
See id. at 1308 (pointing out that allowing a strip down “place[s] [the
lender] in the same position as if the property had been liquidated”).
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
David Gray Carlson, Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims in
Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 13 (1996).
149
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419–20 (1992).
150
Id. at 413.
151
Id. at 410.
152
Id. at 412.
153
There are many types of adversary proceedings in a bankruptcy case.
One type is “a proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien .
144
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attaching to the two parcels of farmland.154 The bankruptcy court
determined that the fair market value of the debtors’ home was
$39,000.155 Thus, the debtors sought to reduce the value of the lien
to $39,000 and then redeem156 the property by paying the creditor
$39,000.157 The debtors made the same argument that had
succeeded in Gaglia: section 506(a)(1) bifurcated the lienholder’s
claim into a secured claim and an unsecured claim, and section
506(d) voided the lien attached to the unsecured claim.158
The bankruptcy court denied the debtors’ request for relief.159
The court assumed that the trustee had abandoned the property160
and concluded that section 506(d)’s avoidance power did not apply
because abandoned property is not “an allowed, secured claim.”161
The bankruptcy court also reasoned that use of section 506(d) to
avoid the unsecured portion of a mortgage would be “unfair and
inequitable.”162 The court insisted upon examining section 506(d)
in light of the entire Bankruptcy Code and not in isolation.163 The
district court affirmed without a supporting opinion.164
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also affirmed the
bankruptcy court’s decision.165 The court stated that the
. . .” FED. R. BANKR. PRO. 7001(2).
154
In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. 676, 677 (Bankr. D. Utah 1988).
155
Id.
156
Redeeming real property is no longer an option for a Chapter 7 debtor.
See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (2012) (restricting the right of redemption to personal
property). Now a Chapter 7 debtor would have to reaffirm the debt in order to
retain his home. See id. § 524(c); see also 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶ 524.04.
157
In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 677.
158
Id.
159
Id. at 683.
160
The term “abandoned property” has nothing to do with whether the
debtor lives on the property. Abandoned property is property that the Chapter 7
trustee has chosen not to seize and sell to benefit the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 554.
Here, the property was abandoned because the mortgage was under-secured and
a sale of the property would not benefit the estate. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588,
589 (10th Cir. 1990); see also In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 683.
161
In re Dewsnup, 87 B.R. at 683.
162
Id. at 680.
163
Id. at 682.
164
In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 589.
165
Id. at 590.
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bankruptcy estate had no interest in abandoned property; therefore,
section 506(a) did not apply and the lienholder’s claim could not
be severed into a secured portion and an unsecured portion.166 And
if section 506(a) did not apply, the lienholder held only a secured
claim, and section 506(d) could not act to void any portion of a
secured claim.167 The court sided with bankruptcy courts that had
denied strip down and concluded that strip down “inequitably
give[s] debtors in a Chapter 7 liquidation more than they would
receive in the reorganization chapters.”168 The court recognized
that its decision directly conflicted with the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gaglia.169
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the circuit
split between the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Gaglia
and the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Dewsnup.170 To
the debtors’ argument that section 506(d) voided the unsecured
claim created by section 506(a)(1), the lienholder responded that
section 506(d), which voids a lien attached to an “allowed secured
claim,” does not void all liens attached to unsecured claims.171
Under the lienholder’s interpretation, section 506(d) only voids the

166

Id. at 589.
Id.
168
Id. Although not titled as such, Chapter 13 is the consumer
reorganization section. Congress created Chapter 13 in order to provide
consumer debtors with regular income the ability to pay off their debts over time
in exchange for more easily retaining their assets. See 8 COLLIER, supra note 22,
¶ 1300.02. At the time the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued this
opinion, the Ninth and Third Circuit courts had allowed strip downs in Chapter
13 cases. See Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortg. Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 124 (3d
Cir. 1990) (holding “(1) that the unsecured portion of the Commonwealth’s
claim may be modified and (2) that Commonwealth’s claim was secured by
personal property as well as by the debtor’s residence and, therefore, the antimodification provision of section 1322 does not apply.”); In re Hougland, 886
F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The secured portion has special protection
when residential real estate lending is involved. The unsecured portion does
not.”).
169
In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 589.
170
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 414 (1992). The Tenth Circuit and the
Third Circuit were the only two federal appellate courts to directly address the
issue of strip down in Chapter 7. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d at 589.
171
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415.
167
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liens on claims that are not both allowed and secured.172 Both the
secured and unsecured claims of this lienholder were clearly
allowed.173 Thus, the lender reasoned, the lien-voiding provision of
section 506(d) did not apply.174 Further, the lender stressed that
“pre-Code bankruptcy law preserved liens” like this one.175
In a 6-2176 decision, the Court found for the lender.177 The
Court found ambiguity in the statutory interplay of sections 506(a)
and 506(d).178 The Court agreed with the lender’s argument that
“liens [generally] pass through bankruptcy unaffected.”179 Further,
the Court noted that Congress would have made clear any desire to
depart from this rule if Congress intended such a result from the
combination of sections 506(a) and 506(d).180 The Court stated that
the entirety of the lien should “stay[] with the real property until

172

Id.
See id. Section 502 deals with the claims allowance process. 11 U.S.C. §
502 (2012). The Code defines “claim” as “right to payment.” Id. § 101(5)(A).
For the secured creditor in Dewsnup, no issue existed as to the lender’s right to
payment. See Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415.
174
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 415.
175
Id. at 416. This quote refers, inter alia, to the rule in Long v. Bullard,
117 U.S. 617, 621 (1886), protecting the rights of secured creditors to enforce
their lien after the bankruptcy case closes. See also 4 COLLIER, supra note 22, ¶
524.02[2][d] (“The bankruptcy discharge will not prevent enforcement of valid
liens.”).
176
Justice Thomas did not participate in the decision. See Dewsnup, 502
U.S. at 410.
177
Id. at 417.
178
Id. The Court noted that liens attached to claims that were not allowed
were voided by 11 U.S.C. § 506(d). Id. at 415–16. Such a conclusion, however,
makes section 506(d) superfluous because “we do not need [section] 506(d) to
tell us that a lien is dead if it secures a claim disallowed under [section] 502(b).”
Carlson, supra note 148, at 5.
179
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 417. This statement by the Court ignores the
powers of the Code which can affect liens in many ways. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)
(the so-called strong arm clause that avoids unperfected security interests); id. §
1325(a)(5)(B) (the cramdown provision that allows a Chapter 13 debtor to strip
down the value of a lien to the value of the collateral securing it); see also
Howard, Secured Claims, supra note 106, at 322. But see 11 U.S.C. §
1322(b)(2) (excepts a home mortgage from cramdown).
180
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420.
173
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the foreclosure,”181 because the mortgagor and the mortgagee had
agreed to just that.182 In addition, the Court reasoned that a
reduction of the value of the lien based on a judicial valuation of
the home’s market value at the time of the filing of the petition
would act to “freeze” the value of the lien so as to deprive the
lienholder of any post-petition increase in home value.183 The
Court stated that a strip down of the lien would impermissibly
endow the debtor with a “windfall” of any post-bankruptcy
increase in the home’s value.184 Finally, the Court expressed that
its holding was limited to these facts.185
Dissenting Justice Scalia argued that the plain language of
sections 506(a)(1) and 506(d) should allow the debtors to strip
down the value of the mortgage on their home.186 Justice Scalia
urged that the term “allowed claim” in section 506(a)(1) clearly
had the same meaning as the term “allowed secured claim” in
section 506(d).187 With these two provisions referring to the same
type of claim, section 506(d) should void a lien attached to any
claim identified by section 506(a) as allowed, but not secured.188
Justice Souter joined the dissent.189
As stated in Justice Scalia’s dissent, the Dewsnup opinion
struggled with the language of sections 506(a) and 506(d).190 How
could one phrase, “allowed secured claim” mean something
different in section 506(a) from what it meant in section 506(d)?191

181

Id. at 417.
Id. at 417–18.
183
Id. at 417.
184
Id.
185
Id. at 416–17.
186
Id. at 420–23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187
Id. at 421–22. As one commentator puts it, the majority’s reading means
that “the phrase ‘allowed secured claim’ in [section] 506(d) means the prebifurcation claim of an undersecured party, even while the same phrase means
the post-bifurcation claim when used in [section] 506(a).” Carlson, supra note
148, at 13, 1.
188
Dewsnup, 502 U.S. at 420–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
189
Id. at 420.
190
Carlson, supra note 148, at 13–14.
191
Id.
182
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The bankruptcy world was “stunned.”192
III. STRIP OFF DIFFERS FROM STRIP DOWN
A. The Unsecured Lienholder Has Nothing to Gain
Under Dewsnup, which is still good law, the debtor in our
example cannot strip down the senior lien on his home from
$200,000 to $150,000, the home’s market value. But what is
unclear is how, if at all, this prohibition of strip down affects strip
off of the junior lienholder.
The position of the senior lienholder—both before and after a
debtor’s bankruptcy—differs from that of the junior lienholder.
When the junior lienholder acquired its lien on the home of our
debtor, the market value of the home was $250,000. The debtor
borrowed the $50,000 in order to have more cash to spend as he
saw fit. Whether the debtor wanted to make a renovation to the
home or pay off other credit card debt, the home equity lender was
satisfied that the junior lien on the debtor’s home provided the
lender with sufficient security to cover the risk of default. The
junior lienholder knew of the presence of the senior lien at the time
the lender sold the home equity loan because it was a matter of
public record.193 It was a matter of public record because the senior
lienholder had perfected its security interest by filing its lien with a
public office.194 Thus, the junior lien acquired “the property
subject to prior encumbrances.”195
Foreclosure differs greatly for a junior lienholder because of
the senior lienholder’s right to foreclose. Foreclosure by a senior
lienholder generally extinguishes the lien of the junior
lienholder.196 The proceeds of the senior lienholder’s foreclosure
sale are distributed in priority order; the senior lienholder is
satisfied in full before the junior lienholder receives any sale
192

Id. at 13.
See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 819 (“A junior mortgagee’s
security is the property subject to prior encumbrances.”).
194
See 12 HOLTZSCHUE, supra note 66, § 41.01 (describing the process of
recording a security interest).
195
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 33, at 819.
196
Id. at 819–21.
193
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proceeds.197 In the case of our debtor, a foreclosure sale by the
senior lienholder will return proceeds of at most $150,000, the
market value of the home. These proceeds will go entirely to the
senior lienholder, and the junior lienholder will lose its lien and get
nothing in return.198
The presence of the senior lien also influences the decision to
foreclose by the junior lienholder. If a junior lienholder forecloses
on its lien and a senior lienholder does not foreclose, the junior
lienholder sells at the foreclosure sale its subordinate position to
the senior lien.199 In the case of our debtor, the foreclosing junior
lienholder would sell a $50,000 lien, in subordinated position to a
$200,000 lien on a home worth $150,000. Clearly, this junior lien
would not be an attractive purchase. The foreclosing junior
lienholder would lose its lien for nothing. Thus, the unsecured
junior lienholder receives no return on its lien in a foreclosure sale
whether the sale is done by the senior lienholder or the junior
lienholder.200
In 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in In re
McNeal granted strip off to a debtor in a similar position to our
debtor.201 There, the market value of the debtor’s home was
$141,416.202 The home was subject to a senior lien worth $176,413
and a junior lien worth $44,444.203 As in the case of our debtor, the
market price of the home left the junior lien with no value in the
collateral.204 The court relied on its reasoning from a pre-Dewsnup
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit case,205 Folendore v.

197

See id. (describing the economically and legally advantageous position
of the senior lienholder over the junior lienholder).
198
See id. at 821 (a senior lienholder has priority over proceeds in a
foreclosure sale).
199
Id. at 819.
200
See id. at 819–21.
201
See In re McNeal, F. App’x 562, 563 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that the
debtor’s home was encumbered by an under-secured lien and an unsecured lien).
202
Id.
203
Id.
204
See id. (noting that the debtor’s home was encumbered by an undersecured lien and an unsecured lien).
205
Id. at 564–65.
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United States Small Bus. Admin.206
In 1989, the Folendore court granted a strip off for two
reasons. First, the junior lienholder would get nothing from either
its own foreclosure sale or the sale of the senior lienholder.207
Second, strip off would help provide the debtor with a fresh start,
which is “the whole point of bankruptcy.”208 The junior lienholder
in Folendore was in the same position as the junior lienholder in
McNeal and the junior lienholder in our example: the aggregate
value of senior liens exceeded the market value of the home.209
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the
correct decision in Folendore and McNeal. The unsecured junior
lien will not bring a return in a foreclosure sale, and the removal of
the unsecured lien will enhance the debtor’s fresh start. At the very
least, the absence of the lien means the debtor will have one less
debt to reaffirm on his home.
B. Post-Bankruptcy Increase in the Home’s Value
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Folendore examines a post-bankruptcy foreclosure sale using the
market value of the debtor’s home during bankruptcy.210 The
bankruptcy’s market value of the property is the appropriate
measure of the impact of foreclosure on the junior lienholder if the
market value remains the same. If the foreclosure sale by either the
senior or junior lienholder closely follows the bankruptcy, the
home will most likely have the same market value. But what if the
foreclosure sale happens long enough after the bankruptcy that the
property’s value increases enough that the junior lienholder gets
some value for its lien?
The possibility of a post-bankruptcy increase in the home’s
value situation concerned the Dewsnup Court.211 The Court stated
206

In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
See id. at 1540.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 1538.
210
See id. at 1540 (noting the power of the senior lienholder to “foreclose
and annihilate” the junior lien because no value in the home covered the junior
lien).
211
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417–18 (1992).
207
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that a strip down based on the market value at the time of the
bankruptcy impermissibly acted to “freeze” the value of the
collateral.212 In other words, stripping down a lien to the market
value would prevent the under-secured creditor from securing any
future increase in the property value.213 In the case of our debtor, if
he could strip down the senior lien to $150,000, the senior
lienholder would hold a lien valued at $150,000. If the value of the
home increased post-bankruptcy to $175,000, the senior lienholder
would not get any of the new value of the home. Thus, the Court
found it unfair to deprive the under-secured lienholder of its
chance at this increase in the home’s value by stripping down its
lien.214
In 1998, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
held in In re Laskin that a Chapter 7 strip off was impermissible
because a strip off would deprive a junior lienholder of an increase
in the value of the collateral.215 In so holding, the court extended
the Dewsnup prohibition of strip down, which affects an undersecured creditor,216 to prohibit strip off, which affects an unsecured
creditor.217 In 2001, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Ryan v. Homecomings Financial Network,218 denied Chapter 7
strip off for the same reasons as those relied on in In re Laskin.219
In 2003, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in In re Talbert
also denied Chapter 7 strip off in order to protect the possibility of
future value for the unsecured lienholder.220
212
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215
In re Laskin, 22 B.R. 872, 876 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).
216
Id. at 874.
217
Id. at 876.
218
Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network (In re Ryan), 253 F.3d 778 (4th
Cir. 2001).
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The decisions of the Laskin, Ryan, and Talbert courts treat the
under-secured lienholder’s chance at future value as equal to the
unsecured lienholder’s chance, but as a practical matter they are
not equal. Consider the case of our debtor. The under-secured
lienholder is owed $200,000. The home is worth $150,000. The
junior unsecured lienholder is owed $50,000. In order for the
under-secured lien to increase in value, the home must only go up
by $1! An increase of $5,000 in the home’s value would be
significant to the under-secured creditor. But look at the unsecured
junior lienholder. In order for this lien to have any value, the
home’s value must increase by $50,001, beyond the full value of
the under-secured lienholder. Thus, as a practical matter, the right
of the unsecured lienholder to future value in the home is not
equivalent to that of the senior lienholder. Therefore, courts should
recognize the economic inequality to post-bankruptcy increase in
the home’s value between the unsecured lienholder and the undersecured lienholder.
C. Folendore
In 1989, before Dewsnup, Laskin, Ryan, and Talbert, the
Folendore court refuted the need to protect the post-bankruptcy
rights of an unsecured lienholder.221 The court noted that the junior
lienholder wanted to preserve its unsecured lien in the hope that
the home’s value would eventually increase enough so as to
provide the creditor with some equity, or coverage, of this junior
lien.222 The court called this argument of the junior lienholder
“self-defeating.”223 The court pointed out that the junior lien
remaining on the debtors’ property would, ironically, actually
decrease the likelihood of the creditor reacquiring some equity in
the home: the presence of the junior lien would “provide[]
incentive for the [debtors] to abandon the property.”224 The court
stated that:
additional avoiding power on a Chapter 7 debtor.”) (citation omitted) (quoting In
re Laskin, 222 B.R. at 876).
221
In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989).
222
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223
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224
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There is no reason the [debtors] should remain on a
piece of property on which the [junior lienholder]
can attach any equity [the debtors] manage to
generate. [The debtors], and any other postdischarge possessors of real property, would be far
better off finding unencumbered property upon
which to start their financial life afresh.225
Thus, the court reasoned that preserving the unsecured junior
lien actually dis-incentivizes a homeowner from keeping his
home.226 The debtor will be financially better off if he abandons
the home and buys a new house.227
This is sound reasoning. The Folendore court understands that
the preservation of the unsecured junior lien makes the home a less
attractive financial investment for the debtor.228 The court also
understands that the loss incurred by strip off to the junior
lienholder is only the loss of the slim chance at future value.229
This slim chance is not worth the damage it can do to the debtor by
forcing him out of his home, reasoned the court correctly.230
The Folendore court did fail to recognize another deleterious
effect of the preservation of the junior lien. If the preservation of
the junior lien causes the debtor to abandon the home, the debtor
will not reaffirm the debt to the senior lienholder. This senior
lienholder will then have to foreclose on the abandoned property
and sustain a greater loss than it would have in a negotiated
reaffirmation agreement. Property law has a priority system for
security interests so as to prevent the junior lienholder from
harming the senior lienholder.231 Further, the junior lienholder who
keeps his lien under Laskin, Ryan, and Talbert only gets the chance
at future attachment to equity in the home.232 But preserving this
225
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chance comes at the expense of the present interests of the senior
lienholder. It is unfair to preserve the future opportunity of the
junior lienholder at the present expense of the more senior
lienholder when the senior lienholder has a lot to lose (the debtor
abandoning the home and the loss of a foreclosure sale) and the
junior lienholder’s chance at future equity is so slim.
D. The Debtor Needs a Chance at Future Home Equity
Dewsnup prohibits strip downs because they deprive the undersecured lienholder of potential future home equity.233 Laskin,
Ryan, and Talbert prohibit strip off for the same reason because it
deprives the unsecured lienholder of potential future equity.234
However, the debtor’s need for future home equity outweighs the
lienholder’s right for a chance at future home equity. After all, the
goal of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy “is to disencumber the future to
provide debtors a fresh start.”235 The debtor should have the
opportunity to keep his home after the bankruptcy and, if possible,
acquire equity in the home without fearing a junior lienholder who
waits to attach to that equity. In the case of our debtor, he should
get a real fresh start. He should be able to sell his home if it
increases in value and use the equity generated to improve his
financial position. This is better policy than denying strip off,
which results in either (1) the debtor abandoning his home; or (2)
the debtor remaining in his home but losing out on any potential
equity he is able to generate.236
The courts that prohibit strip offs focus on the rights of an
unsecured lienholder as opposed to the value of the lien. 237 After
value today.”) (citation omitted); see also Ryan v. Homecomings Fin. Network
(In re Ryan), 253 F.3d 778, 783 (4th Cir. 2001); Laskin v. First Nat’l Bank of
Keystone (In re Laskin), 222 B.R. 872, 876 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998).
233
Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 (1992).
234
In re Talbert, 344 F.3d at 561; see also In re Ryan, 253 F.3d at 783; In
re Laskin, 222 B.R. at 876.
235
Henderson, supra note 26, at 136.
236
See In re Folendore, 862 F.2d 1537, 1540 (11th Cir. 1989).
237
See In re Talbert, 344 F.3d at 561; In re Ryan, 253 F.3d at 783 (noting
that protecting the lienholder’s interest in full post-bankruptcy applies to a strip
off situation); In re Laskin, 222 B.R. at 876.
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all, the junior lienholder in our example holds a claim unsecured
by value in the home. This claim is, at present, valueless. To
prohibit strip off, then, is to change the focus of bankruptcy from
providing the debtor a fresh start to protecting the rights and
possible future profits of creditors.
A bankruptcy court should evaluate a junior lien in light of the
importance of the debtor’s fresh start and the bleak outlook of the
lienholder’s economic position. Viewing a strip off through the
economic realities of the parties outweighs viewing the junior lien
from the perspective of the lienholder’s in rem rights. In fact, as
Professor Margaret Howard points out in her critique of the
Dewsnup decision, protection of a creditor’s in rem rights has not
been the focus of bankruptcy since the bankruptcy courts were
created in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.238 Howard traces the
history of pre-Code opinions and criticizes the Dewsnup Court for
erroneously construing bankruptcy law as a system that protects of
the rights of secured creditors.239 Howard claims that both preCode bankruptcy law and “the Code [itself] shift[] focus away
from in rem rights towards protection of the value of those
rights . . . .”240 To focus on respecting the rights of a secured
creditor, without regard to the value of those rights, ignores the
fact that “[t]he history of bankruptcy law shows a steady alteration
of the rights of secured creditors, undertaken for the purposes of
achieving equality of distribution and assuring the debtor a fresh
start.”241 Thus, according to Howard, bankruptcy has never served
the purpose of sacrificing the debtor’s present needs in order to
protect the post-petition rights of a secured creditor.242 Bankruptcy
has always served to give the debtor a fresh start and distribute the
debtor’s assets equitably.243
In an article written shortly before Dewsnup, Professor Joann
Henderson comments on bankruptcy policy and supports Howard’s
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assertions.244 Henderson argues that protecting secured creditors’
rights to future equity is the business of state law.245 But
bankruptcy necessarily disrupts the rights of creditors in order to
provide the debtor with a fresh start.246 Henderson states that, for
example, a bankruptcy discharge serves to disrupt state law
property rights.247 In other words, discharge alters a
“nonbankruptcy entitlement.”248 A strip off would be another way
to alter a nonbankruptcy entitlement. The junior lienholder would
lose its lien and incur a loss, but the debtor would get to keep his
home. The history of bankruptcy law has often had to choose the
debtor’s fresh start over the disturbance of a lienholder’s rights,249
and strip off would simply be another example of that trend.
IV. STRIP OFF IN CHAPTER 13
While Chapter 13 strip offs are not prohibited in any federal
circuit, the Supreme Court prohibited Chapter 13 strip downs in
Nobleman v. American Savings Bank in 1993.250 Since Nobleman,
which only concerned strip downs, all Circuit Courts of Appeals
and Bankruptcy Appellate Panels that have addressed the issue of
strip offs in Chapter 13 filings have allowed them.251 These circuit
244
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court cases reveal strong policy reasons to allow strip off.252 This
policy applies with equal force to strip off in Chapter 7 filings.
In a Chapter 13 plan, the debtor may “modify the rights of
holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured only by a
security interest in real property that is the debtor’s principal
residence . . . .”253 In other words, the debtor may strip down liens
attached to his property. However, the right to strip down does not
apply to all of the debtor’s property. The Supreme Court held in
Nobleman that section 1322(b)(2) prohibited stripping down a lien
attached to the debtor’s primary residence in Chapter 13. 254 The
Court focused on the language in section 1322(b)(2) protecting the
“rights” of lienholders and held that strip down of an undersecured lien would impermissibly modify those rights.255
Justice Stevens wrote a short concurring opinion in Nobleman,
which explained the legislative history behind section
1322(b)(2).256 He noted that the provision intended to offer
“favorable treatment to residential mortgagees . . . to encourage the
flow of capital into the home lending market.”257 Justice Stevens
explained that Congress intended to protect home lenders in
Chapter 13 bankruptcy because such protection would enable these
lenders to make loans more easily.258
Justice Stevens’ concurrence and the appellate opinions on
Chapter 13 strip off reveal strong policy reasons to allow strip off
in Chapter 7. The first appellate court to address Chapter 13 strip
off was the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit in In
re Lam.259 In In re Lam, the court distinguished strip off from the
strip down in Nobleman.260 The court noted that the Nobleman
prohibition of strip down served to protect the under-secured
252
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lienholder, not the unsecured lienholder.261 The court also
described the economically untenable position of the unsecured
lienholder:
An analysis of the state law “rights” afforded a
holder of an unsecured “lien”, if such a situation
exists, indicates these rights are empty rights from a
practical, if not, a legal standpoint. A forced sale of
the property would not result in any financial return
to the lienholder, even if a forced sale could be
accomplished where the lien attaches to nothing.
Nothing secures the “right” of the lienholder to
continue to receive monthly installment payments,
to retain the lien until the debt is paid off, or the
right to accelerate the loan upon default, if there is
no security available to the lienholder to foreclose
on in the event the debtor fails to fulfill the contract
payment obligations.262
Thus, the Lam court stripped off the unsecured lien because the
lienholder had, at the time of the bankruptcy, no real rights, as a
practical matter.263 The Folendore court made the exact same point
in the Chapter 7 strip off context.264 An unsecured lienholder does
not have any enforceable rights unless the home increases in
value.265 It is important to note that the Lam court, the Bankruptcy
Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit, subsequently denied Chapter
7 strip off in Laskin.266 The Laskin opinion delves into the practical
considerations in Lam because Laskin concludes that Dewsnup
decided the issue of Chapter 7 strip off.267 Dewsnup does not
necessarily prohibit strip off, though, as Dewsnup applied to a strip
down situation. And the junior lienholder’s unfavorable position is
the same whether a debtor is in Chapter 13 or Chapter 7. Other
Circuit Courts of Appeals have agreed that strip off is permissible
261
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in Chapter 13 cases.268
The courts’ allowance of strip off has given additional weight
to the policy concerns mentioned in Justice Stevens’
concurrence.269 Justice Stevens noted that Congress was concerned
with giving home purchase lenders “favorable treatment” over
home equity lenders.270 Home purchase lenders lend the money to
purchase a home. Home equity lenders lend money for any
purpose and take a security interest on a home already owned by
the borrower.271 In our example, the home purchase lender has the
senior mortgage of $200,000; its interest was the first on the
property. The home equity lender is the junior lienholder. This
lender lent our debtor $50,000 and took a security interest in the
home subordinate to the senior home purchase lender. The Lam
court noted that “because second mortgages are not in the business
of lending money for home purchases, the same policy reasons for
protection of first mortgages under [section] 1322(b)(2) do not
exist for second mortgages.”272 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, in In re McDonald, identified the purpose of section
1322(b)(2) as promoting home-buying and home-building;
homeowners typically do not use second mortgages for those
purposes.273 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in In re
Bartee, noted that “because secondary lending is targeted primarily
at personal spending, allowing wholly undersecured second
mortgages under the umbrella of [section 1322(b)(2)] would be
unlikely to positively impact home building and buying.”274 The
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court in Bartee also noted that many home equity loans are the
result of predatory lending practices that do not deserve protection
from strip off.275 Thus, second-mortgage lenders do not get
protection from strip off in Chapter 13 because Congress favored
home purchase mortgage lending over home equity lending and
because home equity lenders often use predatory lending
practices.276
These same rationales apply with equal force to a Chapter 7
strip off situation. Homeowners in Chapter 7 took out home equity
loans not for home-buying but, rather, personal spending.277 There
is no reason why home equity lenders should have greater
protection in Chapter 7 than in Chapter 13. Allowing strip off in
Chapter 7 would promote home-buying and home-building, just as
Chapter 13 strip off promotes home-buying and home-building.
Further, it is in the best financial interest of the senior lienholder if
a Chapter 7 debtor is able to retain his home, because then the
senior lienholder avoids the loss incurred by the foreclosure sale.278
Allowing strip off in a Chapter 7 case increases the likelihood that
a Chapter 7 debtor retains his home and the senior lienholder
avoids that loss.279 Denial of strip off may actually hurt the senior
lienholder since the debtor may choose to abandon his home
because the junior lien will encumber it post-bankruptcy.280
Also, many of the junior liens currently encumbering homes
are the product of predatory or bad lending practices.281 The home
equity lending market was full of irresponsible lending practices in
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the early 2000s.282 These shady lending practices contributed to
many of the unsecured junior liens currently encumbering
American homes.283 Thus, the reasons to allow strip off in Chapter
13 apply to Chapter 7.
CONCLUSION
Implementing a Chapter 7 strip off provision would help the
current housing crisis. A debtor could more easily retain his home
because he would have only one lienholder with which to reaffirm
debt. Also, the junior lienholder holds a lien that, at the time of the
bankruptcy, is worthless. This lien may increase in value, and a
strip off eliminates a junior lienholder’s chance at that increase, but
this chance is slim, and the debtor’s need to retain his home
outweighs providing a junior lienholder with a slim chance at
avoiding a loss. Finally, Chapter 7 debtors should have the same
right to strip off that Chapter 13 debtors get, because Chapter 7
strip off would, as it does in Chapter 13, favor home purchase
lenders over home equity lenders. Thus, Congress should amend
the Bankruptcy Code so that a Chapter 7 debtor may strip off the
lien attached to the debtor’s home of a junior, unsecured
lienholder.
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